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Hetsko: Debtors' and Creditors' Due Process: Applying the Balancing Stand
DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS' DUE PROCESS:
APPLYING THE BALANCING STANDARD
INTRODUCTION

Prejudgment writs of attachment and garnishment have long been important tools for the protection of the creditor. By removing certain assets
from the debtor's control prior to a final determination of liability, the creditor
secures immediate protection from intentional or negligent damage to property
that may provide the only means for satisfying his claim once it is reduced to
judgment.' Both writs are classified as extraordinary remedies, 2 yet they differ
in that attachment authorizes seizure of the debtor's property in his possession,'
while garnishment permits removal from third persons of property belonging
to or money owed to the debtor, to whom the creditor is subrogated. 4
In this country both attachment and garnishment have developed primarily
as statutory remedies, 5 though their origin can be traced to the custom of
London merchants.6 Under the London custom, garnishment was used to
compel the debtor's appearance and, in default of appearance, to satisfy the
debt.7 This practice was expanded in the New England colonies to include
prejudgment seizure of tangible assets in the debtor's possession. 8 Thus, prejudgment seizure emerged as a method to secure the judgment that the creditor
might ultimately obtain. 9 Most jurisdictions subsequently limited the use of
prejudgment remedies to special situations such as nonresidency, concealment
or absence of the debtor, and actual or threatened secretion or disposition of
the property to make it unavailable to creditors. 10
1.

See, e.g., Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 211 U.S. 239 (1908); Barber v.

Morgan, 84 Conn. 618, 80 A. 791 (1911); Ex parte Fuller, 99 Fla. 1165, 128 So. 483 (1930);
Grimestad v. Lofgren, 105 Minn. 286, 117 N.W. 515 (1908).
2. See, e.g., F.A. Haber g=Co. v. Nassitts, 12 Fla. 589, 609 (1868); C.
BY ATrACHMENT

§4a (7th ed. 1891); 1 R.

SHINN,

DRAKE, LAW OF

ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT

§2

SUITS

(1896).

3. See, e.g., Steen v. Ross, Keen & Co., 22 Fla. 480 (1886); Union Bank & Trust Co. v.
Edwards, 281 Ky. 693, 137 S.W. 2d 344 (Ct. App. 1940).
4. See, e.g., Consolidated Nat'l Bank v. Reiniger Mining & Smelting Co., 111 Cal. App.
64, 295 P. 79 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Pleasant Valley Farms & Morey Condensery Co. v. Carl,
90 Fla. 420, 106 So. 427 (1925).

5.

See, e.g., Loewe v. Savings Bank, 236 F. 444 (2d Cir. 1916); Williams v. T.R. Sweat &

Co., 103 Fla. 461, 137 So. 698 (1931); Freeport Motor Cas. Co. v. Madden, 354 II. 486, 188
N.E. 415 (1933). Contra, Barber v. Morgan, 84 Conn. 618, 80 A. 791 (1911).
6. C. DRAKE, supra note 2, §1. See, e.g., L. Bucki & Son Lumber Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co., 109 F. 393 (5th Cir. 1901), aff'd, 189 U.S. 135 (1903); International Bedding Co. v.

Terminal Warehouse Co., 146 Md. 479, 126 A. 902 (Ct. App. 1924). The remedies have also
been traced to Roman law. R. SHINN, supra note 2, §. See Fulwider v. Benda, 62 S.D. 400,
253 N.W. 154 (1934).
7. C. DRAKE, supra note 2, §5; 1 R. SHINN, supra note 2, §2.
8. Williams, Creditors' Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding Strictures On Traditional
Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 60, 63 (1972).
9. R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 489 (1952).
10.

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §76.04 (1975).
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Despite the obvious lack of notice and hearing inherent in the prejudgment
seizure process, attachment and garnishment were rarely challenged on procedural due process gTounds before 1969. Under the then prevailing view, due
process was satisfied if an opportunity for a hearing was provided before the
property was ultimately subjected to the claims of creditors.11 In its 1969
decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,12 however, the United States
Supreme Court dramatically increased the constitutional scrutiny accorded
creditors' prejudgment remedies. The landmark decision in Sniadach was the
first in a series of Court decisions analyzing the constitutional requirements
for prejudgment seizure.
This note focuses on lower court applications of Supreme Court decisions
after Sniadach as they affect attachment and garnishment. 3 The first section
reviews and analyzes the major Supreme Court decisions from Sniadach
through Carey v. Sugar,'4 and suggests that these decisions, appearing to be
11. See, e.g., McKay v. Mclnnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929) (per curiam); Coffin Bros. & Co. v.
Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).

12. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
13. Many states have statutes according liens to landlords, hotelkeepers, warehousemen,
mechanics, and materialmen for goods or services rendered. Some states also provide a
statutory procedure to be followed in foreclosure sales resulting from deeds of trust. When
ex parte seizure is allowed, the first constitutional consideration is whether any state action is
involved. Unless state action is involved in a procedure, the guarantees of due process do not
apply. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1 provides in part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
"
State action is most readily found if the property is seized by a state officer. See, e.g.,
Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (landlord lien); Santiago v. McElroy,
319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (distress for rent); Stevenson v. Cullen Center, Inc., 525
S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (landlord lien). If a state officer is not involved, a court
may still find state action if a statute authorizes action by the creditor of a type normally
performed by a state officer. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975)
(innkeepers' lien); Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (innkeepers' lien); Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973)
(U.C.C. self-help repossession). But see Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975)
(boardinghouse lien); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974) (U.C.C. self-help repossession); Brooks v. Flagg Bros., Inc.,
404 F. Supp. 1059 (1975) (U.C.C. warehousemen's lien sale); USA I Lehndorff Vermoegensverwaltung v. Cousins Club, Inc., 64 Il. 2d 11, 348 N.E. 2d 831 (1976) (landlord distress for
rent). State action generally has not been found in cases involving foreclosure sales under
deeds of trust, even though statutes provided specific steps to follow for the foreclosure to be
valid. See, e.g., Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975); Barrera
v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975). But see Roberts v. CameronBrown Co., 410 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Ga. 1975) (finding state action where HUD had required
inclusion of power of sale clause); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975)
(finding of state action in extensive statutory duties and powers of clerk).
14. 425 U.S. 73 (1976). The other major cases in the Sniadach series are North Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974); and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Commentators have expressed divergent
opinions on the effect of this series. See Catz & Robinson, Due Process and Creditor's
Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgia and Beyond, 28 Rurom.s
L. Rzv. 541 (1975); Pearson, Due Process and the Debtor: The Impact of Mitchell (pts. 1-2),
28-29 OKrA. L. REv. 743, 277 (1975-1976); Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional
Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. Rzv. 807 (1975). The
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ambiguous and conflicting, may rest on an underlying consistency. 1 The
second section examines lower court decisions following recent Court pro-

nouncements and assesses the varying interpretations of Court mandates,
identifying particular safeguards that have been consistently emphasized. 16
The last section offers some concluding observations on the present state of
7
the law and the directions taken in recent court decisions.1
DUE PROCEss GUARANTEES APPLIED TO PREJUDGMENT SEIZURES

The Supreme Court placed constitutional limitations on the provisional
writs for the first time in the 1969 Sniadach's decision. In Sniadach, the creditor instituted a garnishment proceeding against the debtor's employer alleging
a claim due on a promissory note. A summons of garnishment was issued by
the court clerk without prior notice to the debtor and without a prior hearing.
Emphasizing the hardship produced by deprivation of wages and the resulting
power of the creditor to force the debtor to satisfy the debt, 19 the Court held
the Wisconsin procedure to be a violation of due process because it effected a
deprivation of property without prior notice and a hearing. Significantly, the
Court did not rule ex parte prejudgment procedures unconstitutional per se,
but instead maintained that such procedures meet due process requirements in
certain extraordinary situations in which the interest of a state or creditor
commanded special protection and the applicable statute was narrowly drawn
to meet those unusual conditions.2 0 The decision did not resolve whether
garnishment of wages must be preceded by notice and a hearing, and whether
notice and the mere opportunity for a prior hearing would suffice. 2 1 Furthermore, the extent to which the Court's reasoning applied beyond garnishment
2
of wages was also left undecided. 2
Court decisions have also caused lower courts considerable confusion. See, e.g., Ragin v.
Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (applied a combination of Fuentes and Di-Chem);
Terranova v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 1402, 1407 (D. Vt. 1975) (commented on the
uncertain course of the Supreme Court); Thornton v. Carson, I11 Ariz. 490, 491, 533 P.2d
657, 658 (1975) (Mitchell either overruled Fuentes, or represented a considerable retreat from
Fuentes); Thompson v. DeHart, 84 Wash. 2d 931, 530 P.2d 272 (1975) (applied a mixture of
Mitchell and Fuentes).
15. See text accompanying notes 18-61 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 62-170 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 171-195 infra.
18. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
19. Id. at 340-42. The Court noted recent congressional hearings on wage garnishment
and two law review articles that had exposed the enormous power of the creditor to force a
low income wage earner to pay a small alleged debt in order to gain release of his wages.
See Note, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REV. 743
(1968); Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 759.
20. 395 U.S. at 339.
21. Not only did the Court's ambiguity pose problems for lower courts ruling on the
constitutionality of prejudgment seizure procedures, but legislatures could assure that such
statutes would be upheld only by including a preseizure hearing requirement. Such a requirement could greatly increase the costs of prejudgment procedures. See Scott, supra note 14, at
817-18.
22. Id. at 817. Some lower courts interpreted Sniadaeh as applying only to garnishment of
wages. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J. & P. Inc., 424 F,2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Aaron v.
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The unanswered questions of Sniadach were addressed three years later in
Fuentes v. Shevin.23 In that case, the Court struck down Pennsylvania and
Florida replevin statutes that permitted the seizure of household items 24 other
than necessities without prior notice under writs of replevin after the debtors
had defaulted on installment sales contracts. The creditors in Fuentes, unlike
the creditor in Sniadach, had prior interests in the property seized. The Court
in Fuentes deemed this distinction to be immaterial and refused to limit
Sniadach to wages, stating that Sniadach was "in the mainstream of past cases,
having little or nothing to do with the absolute 'necessities' of life, but establishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before a deprivadon of property takes effect."25
The Florida statute 26 invalidated in Fuentes allowed a writ of replevin to
be issued by a clerk of the court upon the creditor's conclusory allegation that
his goods were wrongfully detained. Prior to the issuance of the writ, the plaintiff was also required to file a complaint stating that he was lawfully entitled
to possession of the property, thereby initiating a court action for repossession,
and post a double bond. The Florida law allowed the defendant to recover
possession of the property at the required trial on the merits in the repossession
action. The Pennsylvania statute contained similar provisions, except that no
hearing on the merits was required unless the defendant initiated such an
27
action.
In Fuentes, as in Sniadach, the Court stressed the deprivation of property
suffered by the debtor and overlooked the prior possessory interest of the
Fuentes creditor in the seized property. 28 The invalidation of the prejudgment
seizure statutes was qualified, though, by the Court's suggestion of one exception to the requirement for prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing.
Building on the Sniadach reference to extraordinary situations,2 the Court
reasoned that seizure still would be permitted without notice or prior hearing
if the seizure was necessary to secure an important governmental or general
public interest, there was a special need for prompt action, and the state
Clark, 342 F. Supp. 898 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md.
1971); Almor Furniture & Appliances, Inc. v. MacMillan, 116 N.J. Super. 65, 280 A.2d 862

(Dist. Ct. 1971). Other courts extended Sniadach to any prejudgment seizure. See, e.g.,
Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.,
315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); and

other cases collected in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 72 n.5 (1972).
23. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Fuentes was a four to three decision. Justices Powell and
Rehnquist, though members of the Court when the decision was announced, were not
members of the Court at the time the case was argued.
24. Among the items replevied were a stereo record player, a stove, a bed, and a table.
407 U.S. at 71.
25.
26.
27.
28.
buyer.
buyer

Id. at 88.

§§78.01-.21 (1971) (repealed by 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-20, §2).
407 U.S. at 75-78.
In a conditional sales contract, the seller retains title to the goods delivered to the
In theory, either the title does not-pass until the payments are completed, or the
has only a voidable title pending complete payment. See generally 1 G. GILMORE,
SECURry INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 62-85 (1965).
FLA. STAT.

29. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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strictly controlled the actions of officers implementing such procedures.3 0
Listing several examples of measures upheld by the Court in the past,3

1

the

Fuentes Court noted that attachment without notice or prior hearing had
been permitted when "necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court - clearly a
32
most basic and important public interest."
Even though Fuentes appeared to require, except in extraordinary situations, notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to prejudgment seizures,
the decision nonetheless can be interpreted as allowing seizure even if no
extraordinary factors are present. According to Fuentes, the purpose of the
due process right to be heard was to protect the "use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment [in order] to minimize substantively unfair
or mistaken deprivations of property, a danger that is especially great when the
State seizes goods simply upon the application of and for the benefit of a
private party." 33 From this definition of purpose, the Court formulated the
requirement of prior notice and opportunity for a prior hearing, but only
after determining that the Florida and Pennyslvania procedures for issuing a
writ were not functional substitutes for a prior hearing. Accordingly, even
under the Fuentes rationale, some combination of requirements for issuing the
writ might adequately replace a prior hearing. Fuentes apparently required as
a minimum that valid procedures provide for discretionary review by the
officer issuing the writ34 and that its issuance be predicated upon facts rather
than conclusory allegations by the creditor.3 5
Although the majority in Fuentes focused narrowly on the interests of
debtor 3 6 the dissent 37 evaluated the overall fairness of the prejudgment
process, taking into account the interests of both parties to a typical installment sales contract.38 The balancing test advocated by the Fuentes dissent was
30. 407 U.S. at 90-93.
31. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (misbranded drugs);
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (bank failure); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589
(1931) (tax collection); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921) (war); North
Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (contaminated food).
32. 407 U.S. at 91 n.23. This statement referred to Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921),
a Supreme Court decision often cited as approving of foreign attachment without prior notice
or hearing. The parties in Own bey, however, never questioned the validity of foreign attachment. The Fuentes reference to Ownbey has been the source of much confusion to lower
courts. See text accompanying notes 143-170 infra.
33. 407 U.S. at 81.
34. The Court in Fuentes said that, although courts will generally refrain from taking
tentative action until it has examined the facts supporting the plaintiff's position, no such
discretionary review was required by the statutes under consideration. Id. at 83.
35. While no court subsequently interpreted Fuentes in this manner, such a reading is
consistent with the later Supreme Court decisions. See text accompanying notes 39-47 infra.
36. See text accompanying note 28 supra. See Scott, supra note 14, at 822-23.
37. Justices White and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger dissented.
38. Although the point was not extensively developed, the dissent questioned the usefulness of a prior hearing, stating that "[ilt is very doubtful . . . that such a hearing would in
fact result in protections for the debtor substantially different from those the present laws
provide." 407 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting). One commentator agrees. See generally
Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 82,
107-13 (1973). But see Dauer 8&Gilhool, The Economics of Constitutionalized Repossession:
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adopted by the majority of the Court in the 1974 decision of Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co.39 Although Mitchell, like Fuentes, 40 involved a creditor's seizure of
property under an installment sales contract, 41 the Louisiana provisions for
issuing the writ differed substantially from the invalidated Florida and Pennsylvania procedures. As required by statute, the plaintiff in Mitchell posted
bond and filed an affidavit alleging specific facts. Only then was the sequestration writ-z issued by a judge having discretionary powers. The Louisiana
sequestration procedure reviewed in Mitchell further safeguarded the interests
of the debtor by providing that the debtor could obtain an immediate postseizure hearing requiring the creditor to prove the grounds on which the writ
had been issued, and that the debtor could regain possession of the seized
43
property by posting a bond.
In holding that the Louisiana procedure did not violate due process, the
Mitchell Court weighed the concurrent interests of the creditor and the debtor
in the seized property. Although implicitly overruling the Fuentes requirement
of a prior hearing, 44 the Court employed a balancing analysis similar to the
A Critiquefor ProfessorJohnson and a PartialReply, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 116, 131-87 (1973).
Even if a prior hearing were held, a substantial number of debtors might not appear in court.
Twelve percent of the debtors surveyed in a New York study claimed never to have been
served with process. D. CAPLovrrz, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE 195 (1974). Of those known to
have been served with process, 15% failed to answer the summons because they did not know
that they were supposed to appear in court. Id. at 205. The Fuentes dissent expressed the
fear that the availability of credit would be diminished and its cost increased by the Court's
decision. In the view of the dissenters, the decision provided the debtor with little or no
additional protection against arbitrary deprivations. 407 U.S. at 102-03 (White, J., dissenting).
39. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
40. The dissenters in Fuentes had become the Court majority by the addition of Justices
Powell and Rehnquist, who had taken no part in the Fuentes decision. The Fuentes dissent's
argument for weighing the interests of the creditor and the debtor in the seized property
was used in Mitchell as the test for determining the constitutionality of the process. 416 U.S.

at 604-07.
41. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
42. Sequestration differs from attachment in that sequestered property is taken into
custody of the court rather than possession of the creditor. After a determination of the
merits of the conflicting claims of the parties, the property is delivered to the party entitled
to possession. The remedy is derived from French, Spanish, and Roman law. Millar, Judicial
Sequestration in Louisiana:Some Account of Its Sources, 30 TUL. L. REv. 201, 216 (1956).
43. 416 U.S. at 605-07, 616-18.
44. See, e.g., id. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 634 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Thornton v. Carson, 111 Ariz. 490, 491, 533 P.2d 657, 658 (1975). Most if not all lower courts
after Fuentes construed it as requiring a prior hearing. See, e.g., Bay State Harness Horse
Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973), Clement v.
Four N. State St. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933 (D.N.H. 1973). Perhaps because of the lower court
response to Fuentes, the majority in Mitchell attempted to distinguish Fuentes to limit its
holding. 407 U.S. at 611-18. The Court could have distinguished Fuentes in several ways.
First the writ in Mitchell was issued upon the order of a judge who acted after being
presented with specific facts supporting the creditor's allegations, while the writ in Fuentes
had been issued following mere conclusory allegations by the creditor. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. at 81, 93. Additionally, the Court in Fuentes had implied that issuance by an officer
with discretionary powers might help to bring the procedure within constitutional parameters, especially if the Court were presented with the underlying facts. Id. at 83. Further, in
contrast to Fuentes, in which neither invalidated statute provided for an immediate post-
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reasoning used in Fuentes, in which the requirements for the issuance of the
writ were analyzed as possible substitutes for a prior hearing but found lacking
because they did not acceptably minimize the danger of an unfair deprivation
of property. 45 Expanding the Fuentes rationale, the Mitchell Court found that
notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to seizure were not required in
all cases, thus adopting the view of the Fuentes dissent by adding concern for
the creditor's interest to the balancing formula. Accordingly, the Court found
that Louisiana sequestration procedures struck the proper constitutional
balance by reducing both the danger of unfair deprivation of property and the
possibility of damage to the creditor's interest through the sale, concealment,
4
or transfer of the property by the debtor .
Apparently, the Court viewed the postseizure hearing as the most crucial
safeguard mentioned in Mitchell, 47 because such a hearing ensured that any
seizure hearing, the Court in Mitchell upheld a statute that provided such an opportunity.
The Mitchell Court noted these differences in the statutes but failed to develop such reasoning in order to distinguish Fuentes. The Court instead relied on the unconvincing ground
that the broad fault standard of wrongful detention involved in Fuentes was ill-suited for
ex parte determination. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 617-18. According to the
Mitchell dissent, however, the issues in Fuentes were the same as those in Mitchell: "the
creditor-vendor needed only to establish his security interest and the debtor-vendee's default."
Id. at 633 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Clearly, the significant difference between Fuentes and
Mitchell lies in the statutory requirements for issuing the writ and an opportunity for an
immediate postseizure hearing. One commentator, however, attributes the Mitchell decision
to the Court's implicit recognition that widespread application of the Fuentes prior hearing
rule would significantly increase the costs of prejudgment seizure without substantially reducing the possibility of a wrongful taking. Scott, supra note 14, at 828.
The Mitchell dissent, composed of the four justices who had formed the Fuentes majority,
construed Fuentes as holding that bond requirements and the simplicity of the issues involved went to the type of notice and hearing necessary prior to seizure, but could not be
substituted for the required prior hearing. 416 U.S. at 631 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For the
dissent, only an extraordinary situation would justify prejudgment seizure without prior
notice. This view, however, misinterprets Fuentes, which left substantial openings for the
possibility that statutory provisions could provide an adequate substitute for the prior notice
and hearing. See text accompanying notes 26-34 supra. Fuentes had stated that the reason
for the prior hearing was to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of
property. Use of other methods to accomplish that end, if available, probably would be
permissible.
Justice Powell's concurrence in Mitchell fell between the majority's balancing approach
and the dissent's absolutist approach. Powell would require that the "creditor furnish adequate security and make a specific factual showing before a neutral officer or magistrate of
probable cause to believe that he is entitled to the relief requested. An opportunity for an
adversary hearing must then be accorded promptly after sequestration to determine the
merits of the controversy, with the burden of proof on the creditor." Id. at 625 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
45. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
46. 416 U.S. at 608-09. Although the vendor in Mitchell had a lien on the property involved which could be destroyed by the debtor conveying the property to a third person, the
danger to creditors posed by fraudulent transfer is present in all cases. In the 49 states in
which the U.C.C. has been adopted, it provides protection of the vendor's security interest
against interests of third party purchasers only if the creditor files a financing statement.
U.C.C. §9-201. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §25-2, at 901 (1972).
47.

Those requirements were the following:

(1) bond posting by the creditor;
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wrongful seizure undertaken without notice or hearing would be rectified
promptly. Although certain safeguards in the Louisiana statute were clearly
more important than others to the Court, Mitchell did not hold that any
particular safeguard was constitutionally required. 48
Less than one year after Mitchell was decided, however, the Court appeared
to indicate that some or all of the safeguards were constitutionally mandated.
In North GeorgiaFinishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,49 the Court invalidated the

Georgia garnishment statute on facts in which, unlike the earlier cases, both
parties were businesses. The creditor corporation had filed for process of
garnishment against the debtor's bank account simultaneously with instituting
suit. To obtain the writ, the creditor posted a double bond and filed an
affidavit containing conclusory allegations. The writ was then issued by the
clerk of tie court. The only method of dissolution available to the debtor was
the filing of a bond.In holding the Georgia statute unconstitutional, the Court in Di-Chem
appeared to apply Mitchell in a mechanical fashion. The Court did not profess
to balance the interests of the creditor and the debtor, but instead apparently
found the process invalid because it lacked several of the five safeguards contained in the statute upheld in Mitchell.51 Further analysis reveals that the
Di-Chem Court apparently was simply listing the deficiencies of a procedure
clearly unconstitutional because of its uneven balancing of the interests of
debtor and creditor. Especially important was the absence of an opportunity
for an early postseizure hearing. Only substantial alternative safeguards would
have overcome this deficiency, and no such safeguards were incorporated into
the Georgia procedure. In one significant respect Di-Chem expanded the
reach of Mitchell, for the Di-Chem decision implicitly refused to limit Mitchell
to situations in which the creditor had a prior interest in the property seized.
Had the Court chosen to so limit Mitchell, Di-Chem could have declared the
Georgia garnishment statute unconstitutional without applying the balancing
52
test of Mitchell.
Although Di-Chem relied primarily on Mitchell, the Court also cited
Fuentesas requiring notice, an opportunity for an early hearing, and participaaffidavit supported by an allegation of specific facts; (3) issuance of the writ by a judge having discretionary powers; (4) the debtor could move for an immediate postseizure hearing;
and (5) the debtor could regain possession of the seized property by posting a bond. LA.
CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3501, 3506-3508, 3571, 3574, 3576 (West 1961).
48. Two commentators, however, believe that some if not all of the safeguards are constitutionally required. Pearson (pt. 2), supra note 14, at 326; Scott, supra note 14, at 832-33.
49. 419 U.S. 601 (1975). The majority opinion was written by Justice White, who had
been in fhe Fuentes minority, for the Di-Chem majority consisting of White and the Justices
of the Mitchell dissent.
50. GA. CODE ANN. §§46-101 to -201 (1971) (repealed by 1976 Ga. Laws tit. 46).
51. 419 U.S. at 607. Specifically, the procedure was found to be lacking for the following
reasons: (1) the writ was issuable by a clerk; (2) the affidavit contained only conclusory
allegations; and (3) the only method available to dissolve the writ was for the debtor to file
bond. Id.
52. The creditor in Di-Chem had no prior interest in the debtor's bank account. See,
Hutchison v. Bank of N.C., 392 F. Supp. 888, 898 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Pearson, (pt. 2), supra
note 14, at 298-300.
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tion by a judicial officer in the issuance of the writ.5 3 The characterization of
Fuentes as requiring an early hearing seems anomalous, because Fuentes
originally appeared to have required that a hearing be held prior to the
seizure.54 Moreover, the lack of clarity in Di-Chem left substantial questions
as to how far the decision may have revived Fuentes, 5 and thus sowed the
seed of more confusion for lower courts.
The latest Court decision in the Sniadach series is the per curiam opinion
vacating and remanding Carey v. Sugar- to a three-judge district court. The
creditor corporation in Sugar filed suit against the debtor and two other
corporations charging them with a complicated scheme of fraud. Concomitantly, the creditor sought to attach the debts owed by one co-defendant
to another co-defendant. The writs of attachment were issued by a judge after
the creditor had posted bond and had filed an affidavit alleging specific facts.
The debtor corporation did not avail itself of New York procedures providing
for dissolution of the attachment either by giving bond in an amount equal to
the value of the seized property or by prevailing at a court hearing. 57 Applying
Mitchell, the district court held that New York's attachment law violated due
process rights.
In vacating the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court ordered that
court to abstain from deciding the case until New York courts resolved
whether the prescribed hearing immediately following the seizure was designed to determine the likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail on the
merits. The Court, however, refused to consider several issues that the lower
court had considered important. 58 While the district court had struck down
53. Justice Powell objected to the majority's apparent resuscitation of Fuentes. Powell's
concurring opinion reiterated the requirements he had first enumerated in Mitchell as
necessary to satisfy due process. 419 U.S. at 609, 611 (Powell, J., concurring). See note 44
supra.
The dissent in Di-Chem expressed the view that Fuentes had little or no precedential
value after having been severely limited by Mitchell. The dissenters, Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, adhered to the balancing process enunciated in
Mitchell, but disagreed with the Di-Chem majority on the outcome of that balancing based
on the facts in Di-Chem. The dissenters would have upheld the Georgia garnishment statute
as establishing an adequate balance. The dissent emphasized that both parties in Di-Chem
were businesses, as had been the situation in the earlier decisions, rather than a business
suing individual persons. This, coupled with the safeguards of the Georgia statute -that the
debtor was assured a full hearing at some time, that the plaintiff post a double bond, and
that there be a conclusory allegation of apprehension of loss -satisfied the dictates of due
process to the satisfaction of the dissent. The dissent found little need for judicial approval
of the writ as long as the issuing officer was a court officer. Id. at 619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. See text accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
55. According to Professor Scott, Di-Chem appeared to view Mitchell as an exception to
Fuentes. Scott, supra note 14, at 831. This view has also been taken by at least one lower
court decision. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rob. juris. noted
sub nom. Trainor v. Hernandez, 96 S.Ct. 2622 (1976). See text accompanying notes 75-76
infra.
56. 425 U.S. 73 (1976). Suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970).
57. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§6201-6226 (McKinney 1976).
58. Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 648-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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the New York attachment statute primarily because of the supposed lack of an
opportunity for an immediate hearing on the merits of the underlying claim,
the court also contrasted the statute with that in Mitchell and found two
significant distinctions. First, unlike Mitchell the creditor in Sugar had no
concurrent possessory interest in the property attached. Second, while in
Mitchell the only issues to be adjudicated at the ex parte hearing were whether
the debt existed and whether it was delinquent, the more complicated issue of
fraud was involved in Sugar. Fraud, according to the lower court, was not a
matter for documentary proof. The Supreme Court's failure to mention these
issues seems doubly significant in view of the Court order that the lower court
abstain solely on the basis that the New York statute might be constitutional
if it required an opportunity for an immediate hearing on the underlying
merits of the claim. The combined effect of these actions suggests that the
Mitchell balancing process will be used notwithstanding the creditor's lack of
a prior possessory interest in seized property.59
Mitchell and its balancing test o best express the current position of the
Supreme Court in the application of due process guarantees to prejudgment
remedies. As illustrated in Sugar, that balancing process is to be applied
whether or not the creditor had a prior interest in the property seized, and
thus the existence of or nonexistence of a prior interest is just one of many
factors to be weighed. Unfortunately, lower courts have not consistently applied the balancing process to challenged prejudgment remedies. 61 Most of the
lower court confusion can be traced to the Di-Chem decision, with its ambiguous revival of Fuentes and apparently mechanical application of the Mitchell
criteria.
LowER COURT TREATMENT OF PREJUDGMENT SEIZURE AND DUE PROCESS
Supreme Court enunciations of due process requirements for prejudgment
seizures to date have involved only seizure of personal property for nonjurisdictional purposes. Lower courts have been forced to interpret the extent
to which these decisions can be extended beyond the seizure of personal property and applied both to attachment of real property for nonjurisdictional
purposes and to attachment of real or personal property for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresidents.62 Indeed, even when seizure of personal
property is at issue, lower court decisions illustrate ample confusion in deter59. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
60. See text accompanying notes 39-46 supra. See Note, The Supreme Court -1973 Term,

88 HARv. L. REv. 43, 71 (1974).
61. See text accompanying notes 62-170 infra.
62. See, e.g., Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976) (real property
attachment; applied Mitchell); Terranova v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 1402, 1407
(D. Vt. 1975); Allen Trucking Co. v. Adams, 56 Ala. App. 478, 323 So. 2d 367 (Civ. App.
1975) (personal property attachment; applied the Fuentes extraordinary situations excep,
tion); First Recreation Corp. v. Amoroso, 26 Ariz. App. 477, 549 P.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1976)
(real property attachment; no taking of property so Supreme Court decisions on due process
do not apply); Earnest v. L.H. Shor & Assocs., Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 2197 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1976)
(personal property attachment; applied a combination of Fuentes and Mitchell).
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mining the proper due process analysis to be applied. 63 Many lower courts
either have relied on the Court's analysis in Fuentes and Di-Chem or have misapplied the balancing approach first enunciated in Mitchell. Assessing such
inconsistencies, this section evaluates several recent lower court decisions in
three areas: (1) personal property attachment for nonjurisdictional purposes;
(2) real property attachment for nonjurisdictional purposes; and (3) attach64
ment of real or personal property for jurisdictional purposes.
Seizure of Personal Property for Nonjurisdictional Purposes
Although most decisions acknowledge Mitchell as the controlling Supreme
Court decision in this area, 5 many lower courts have failed to utilize the
Mitchell balancing formula properly.6 Instead, they apply that decision in a
mechanical manner as if it required that a prejudgment seizure statute, to be
validated, must contain all five of the protective features of the Louisiana
statute upheld in Mitchell. These lower courts have failed to analyze competing interests to determine whether statutory safeguards sufficiently protect the
creditor's interest in the property while minimizing the possibility of unfair or
mistaken deprivations of a debtor's property.
Mechanical Application of Mitchell. This mechanical application is well
illustrated in Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co.,67 in which the
Supreme Court of Florida ruled that portions of Florida's attachment statute
were unconstitutional in light of Mitchell.68 Admitting its uncertainty as to
the full import of Sniadach and its progeny, the Florida court opined that the
challenged statute violated the dictates of both Fuentes and Mitchell.09 In
Unique Caterers, the creditor, concurrent with filing suit, filed a motion unaccompanied by affidavit for a writ of attachment. After the creditor posted
bond, the writ was issued by a court clerk and property sufficient to satisfy the
claim was seized. Subsequently, the debtor's motion to dissolve the attachment
was denied by the county court.70 Although Florida law provided that the

63. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (Mitchell as an
exception to Fuentes), prob, juris. noted sub nom. Trainor v. Hernandez, 96 S. Ct. 2622 (1976);
Douglas Research & Chem. Inc. v. Soloman, 388 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (applied
both Fuentes and Mitchell).
64. This method of categorization was also used by Professor Pearson in his article
analyzing earlier lower court decisions. Pearson (pt. 2), supra note 14, at 278-79.
65. See, e.g., Garcia v. Krause, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Northside Properties,
Inc. v. Ko-Ko Mart, Inc., 28 N.C. App. 532, 222 S.E.2d 267 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 289 N.C.
615, 223 S.E.2d 392 (1976). Contra, Doran v. Home Mart Bldg. Centers, Inc., 233 Ga. 705, 213
S.E.2d 825 (1975).
66. See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
67. 338 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1976).
68. The Florida prejudgment garnishment statute had been declared unconstitutional in
1975. Bunton v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 793 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
69. 338 So. 2d at 1069, 107L. The court thought that the statute, which did not require
prior notice and hearing, would not fit within the Fuentes extraordinary situations exception.
Id. at 1069.
70. Id. at 1068.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 6
DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS' DUE PROCESS

attachment could be dissolved by the debtor's posting bond,71 the debtor did
not avail himself of this provision. The Florida supreme court stated that
the statutory grounds in Florida probably did not fit within the extraordinary situations exception developed by Fuentes but refused to rest its
decision on this point, noting that subsequent Supreme Court decisions had
substantially modified Fuentes. 72 The Florida court construed Mitchell as
constitutionally requiring all five safeguards present in the Louisiana statute
and found the Florida statute was constitutionally defective for the following
reasons: (1) the writ need not be issued by a judge; (2) when the alleged debt
was due, the writ would issue on the conclusory allegations of the creditor;
and (3) the statute provided an opportunity for, but did not require, an
immediate postseizure hearing7 3
The third shortcoming found in the Florida statute, the absence of an
automatic and immediate postseizure hearing, indicates a significant distortion
of Mitchell. The United States Supreme Court in Mitchell had upheld a law
that, like the statute struck down in Unique Caterers, did not require a postseizure hearing unless requested by the debtor
The Florida supreme court
interpreted Mitchell as compelling a postseizure hearing even in the absence
of such a request. An even more fundamental flaw in the Florida court's
analysis was the determination that Mitchell imposed per se constitutional
requirements for all prejudgment writs. The court's holding ignored Mitchell's
mandate for a balancing of the interests of the debtor and the creditora to
determine whether a particular procedure sufficiently minimized the likelihood
of mistaken deprivations of property while protecting the creditor's interest in
the property.
A mechanical application of Mitchell was used to hold the Illinois attachment statute7 6 unconstitutional in Hernandez v. Danaher.77 In that case, the
Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) filed a complaint charging the
debtors with fraudulent concealment of the existence of certain funds for the
purpose of continuing to receive public aid assistance. IDPA also filed for
attachment of the debtors' credit union funds. Under Illinois law, the court
clerk was required to issue the writ after the creditor posted bond and filed an
affidavit setting forth one of the conclusory allegations prescribed by statute.
The debtor could obtain release of the attached property by filing a double
bond or by prevailing at a postseizure hearing. That hearing might be delayed,
however, for as long as sixty days after the seizure of the property,78 and the
71.

FLA. STAT. §§76.01-.32 (1975).

72. 338 So. 2d at 1069-70. The court said that the effect of Mitchell and Di-Chem on
the Fuentes prior hearing requirement was ambiguous. Id. at 1069.
73. Id. at 1071.
74. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 610.
75. See text accompanying notes 40-48 supra.
76. ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 11, §§1-3, 6, 8, 10, 14 (1973).
77. 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. I1. 1975), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Trainor v. Hernandez,
96 S. Ct. 2622 (1976).
78. The hearing, if requested, would be held as the return date of the writ, set by the

creditor and required to be not less than 10 nor more than 60 days from the date of the writ.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, §§6, 27 (1973).
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hearing in tort cases was limited to determining the potential damages and
thus the maximum value of property to be attached. The court found that
the statutory procedure violated Mitchell for the following reasons: (I) the
attachment was not issued by a judge; (2) the writ was issued upon the
creditor's conclusory allegations, unsupported by an affidavit of facts; and (3)
the debtor had no opportunity for an immediate postseizure hearing at which
to challenge the creditor's entitlement to the writ3 9
The Hernandez court, while mentioning the first two defects in invalidating the statute, emphasized the inability of the debtor to effectively challenge
the grounds for issuance of the writ of attachment after the property had been
seized. 0 Because the Hernandez court construed Mitchell to represent a limited
exception to the Fuentes preseizure hearing requirement, the court failed to
determine whether the statute fairly balanced competing interests. Instead, the
court applied Mitchell as if each of the safeguards in the Louisiana statute
were constitutionally required.
Balancing the Interests. Other decisions have employed a balancing process
to determine the constitutionality of prejudgment seizure procedures. The
Louisiana executory process procedure 8l was upheld by the state supreme
court in Hood Motor Co. v. Lawrence. 2 The challenged procedure allowed a
creditor to seize and sell property ex parte to enforce a mortgage or "privilege"813 on seized property. Prior to seizure the creditor had to submit a petition containing factual allegations, whereupon a judge or clerk could
authorize the sale. The writ in Hood was signed by a clerk.8 4 After seizure of
the property, written notice was served upon the debtor, who was then entitled,
without posting bond, to an injunction against the sale if any of several
statutory grounds was established. 2 Interpreting Court decisions as prohibiting
the automatic issuance of an ex parte writ upon the creditor's conclusory
allegations, the court concluded that due process did not require that a judge
issue the writ but was satisfied if an officer with discretionary powers issued the
writ.8 6 Although the only issue presented to the court was the constitutionality

of a writ issued by a clerk., the court recognized that the validity of the overall
procedure depended on its effectiveness in accommodating competing interests. 87 Accordingly, the Hood debtors were found to be better protected than
the debtors in Fuentes and Di-Chem by requirements that the petition be
supported by facts and that an opportunity be provided for an early postseizure hearing.

79. 405 F. Supp. at 762.
80. Id.
81. LA. CODE CIv. PRo. ANN. art. 2631-2644 (West 1960).
82. 320 So. 2d 111 (La. 1975).
83. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. AN.. art. 2631 (West 1960).
84. 320 So. 2d at 112.
85. LA. CODE Cxv. PRO. ANN. art. 2753 (West 1960).
86. 320 So. 2d at 114-16. While not certain that its deicsion would be upheld if appealed,
the court noted that the Louisiana executory process provided substantial other safeguards to
the debtor's interest and that litchell required only that a neutral officer issue the writ.
87. Id. at 114-15.
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The Eighth Federal Circuit in Guzman v. Western State Bank88 more closely
applied the Mitchell balancing approach and held the prejudgment attachment statute of North Dakota 9 unconstitutional. The Guzman debtors had
financed the purchase of a mobile home by executing promissory notes, which
had been sold to a bank. Increased heating costs resulting from problems in
the mobile home's heating system and windows rendered the debtors unable to
continue payments on their notes. The creditors sued on the default and applied to attach the mobile home, filing an affidavit supported by other documents that showed the existence of the debt and the default. After the bank
posted bond, the writ was issued by the court clerk and the debtors' home was
repossessed.90
In an extensive opinion, the Guzman court examined the North Dakota
statute and the circumstances of the case to determine whether the attachment
procedure sufficiently minimized the possibility of a wrongful taking while
protecting the interests of the creditor. 9' The court found that, even though
the affidavit was supported by allegations of facts, the statute was unconstitutional because it failed to require that the supporting affidavit assert that the
attachment was necessary to preserve the property interest of the creditor. 92
Since Mitchell included in its balancing process the likelihood that the buyer
would conceal or transfer the property to the creditor's detriment,93 the Guzman requirement that this specifically be alleged seems to exceed Mitchell requirements. This additional requirement is broadly consistent with the balancing process of Mitchell, however, inasmuch as the Guzman court required that
a creditor allege or show some substantial reason before being allowed to
deprive a family of its home without prior notice or hearing.
The Guzman court did not find issuance of the writ by a court clerk per se
violative of due process, but instead found that Mitchell required the exercise
of judicial discretion to minimize the likelihood of error. According to Guzman, the exercise of such discretion could determine whether "the impact on
the debtor of even a temporary deprivation of the property outweighs the
interest of the creditor or the state in affording the creditor ex parte attachment." 14 Because the North Dakota statute compelled the clerk to issue the
writ upon filing of certain papers, the court found the protection afforded the
95
debtor to be insufficient.
88. 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975).
89. N.D. CENT. CODE §§32-08-01 to -30 (1976).
90. 516 F.2d at 126-27. The mobile home was seized in early March, when temperatures
were still below freezing. Id.
91. Id. at 128-29.
92. Id. at 130. The Guzman court was influenced by the Fuentes and Mitchell statements
that an attachment must be based upon more than the conclusory allegations of the creditor.
See text accompanying notes 26, 34, 44-46 supra.
93. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 608-09.
94. 516 F.2d at 131.
95. Id. at 131 8- n.7. The Guzman court said in dictum that until clarified by the
Supreme Court the holdings of Mitchell and Di-Chem required that a judge issue the writ.
The court questioned, however, whether the reasoning behind Mitchell required that a judge
issue the writ. Id. This seems to be a more mechanical interpretation of Mitchell than the
Guzman court applied elsewhere in its analysis.
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The most serious deficiency in the procedure assessed in Guzman was the
requirement that a debtor post bond to obtain a hearing to challenge an attachment. The court reasoned that, since the requirement of a bond could
prevent a debtor from contesting attachment of valuable property, this provision undermined the goal of minimizing the impact of a wrongful attachment.96 Furthermore, the court, citing Sniadach, stressed the hardship caused
by seizure of a family's home and found that this detriment clearly outweighed
any interest that the creditor had in effecting prejudgment seizure without
notice or hearing11
The Guzman decision represents a faithful application of the Mitchell
balancing approach to the evaluation of prejudgment seizures of personal
property. Unfortunately, many lower court decisions, such as Unique Caterers
and Hernandez, have held that Mitchell required five specific safeguards and
thus have failed to grasp that Mitchell actually required only that procedures
adequately balance the interests of the creditor and the debtor.
Real Property Attachment for NonjurisdictionalPurposes
With no Supreme Court decision addressing due process requirements for
prejudgment attachment of real property, lower courts faced with this particular problem have divided along two major lines. One line of decisions"5
adheres to the reasoning of the district court decision, summarily affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc.9 9 holding that
a lien attaching to real property did not constitute a significant taking of
property and thus did not invoke due process considerations.100 The other line
96. 516 F.2d at 131. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigents must be
afforded free access to court to obtain divorce).
97. 516 F.2d at 132.
98. See, e.g., In re Northwest Homes, Inc., 526 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 907 (1976); In re The Oronoka, 393 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Me. 1975); First Recreation Corp.
v. Amorosa, 26 Ariz. App. 477, 549 P.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1976).
99. 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973), afJ'd mem., 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
100. Id. The Supreme Court decision was handed down shortly after Mitchell. For a
Supreme Court discussion of the effects of a summary affirmance, see Hicks v. Miranda, 422
U.S. 332 (1975), in which the Court held a lower court in error for disregarding a Supreme
Court decision summarily dismissing for want of a substantial federal question an appeal
from a state court decision upholding the same statute in light of the same constitutional
challenge. There is considerable disagreement over the precedential weight to be given to a
summary decision without opinion. Rios v. Dillman, 499 F.2d 329, 334 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974). In
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974), the Supreme Court stated that summary
affirmances have less precedential value than an opinion of the Court fully addressing the
merits. One circuit has interpreted this as allowing lower courts to reexamine the issue.
Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 707-08 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
Several other circuits, however, have indicated that Edelman means only that the Supreme
Court is less bound by its summary decisions. U.S. ex rel. Wojtycha v. Hopkins, 517 F.2d
420, 424-25 (3d Cir. 1975); Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3, 7 (4th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Hodgson,
500 F.2d 1206, 1207-08 (2d Cir. 1974). One other circuit had indicated prior to Edelman and
Hicks that a Supreme Court summary affirmance of a lower court is binding on the lower
courts. Ahern v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972). The Fifth Circuit has noted that,
where the facts of the case summarily affirmed are distinguishable from those in the case
under review, the court has only its own "reasoned speculation regarding the legal im-
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of lower court decisions finds a significant taking of property when a lien
attaches to real property,o' but these decisions nonetheless demonstrate confusion as to the proper standard required by Supreme Court decisions.
No Taking. In Spielman-Fond, a three-judge district court upheld the constitutionality of the Arizona mechanics' and materialmen's lien statute, 0 2
finding no significant property taking. Liens of creditors who had provided
labor and furnished materials had attached to the debtor's mobile home
park.303 Despite the clouds on title and the difficulty of alienation resulting
from the liens, a three-judge district court found that the owner was deprived
of neither possession nor the ability to sell the property should a willing buyer
be found.1°4
Particular features of the case may limit the reach of Spielman-Fond. First,
the creditors had a prior interest in the attached property because of the labor
and materials furnished, which probably increased the value of the land in an
amount comparable to the decrease in value due to attachment of the lien.
Second, the debtor may have suffered little immediate harm. The owner of the
attached land was in the business of leasing mobile home spaces and he continued to lease spaces despite the attachment. Further, since Spielman-Fond
was decided prior to Mitchell, the district court could have found either no
significant taking, thus escaping the rigid Fuentes prior notice rule, or a significant taking in a situation that probably would not fall within the extraordinary situations exception of Fuentes. Given these circumstances, the
court was justified in finding no significant taking of property because the
debtor was deprived of neither use nor possession and the value of the land
was not significantly diminished by the lien.
Notwithstanding these limitations, a Ninth Federal Circuit decision used the
Spielman-Fond rationale to uphold a prejudgment attachment statute, which
subjected real property to a creditor's lien without prior notice or a judicial
hearing. In In re Northwest Homes, Inc.,05 the creditor sued the debtor for
goods sold and delivered and following the debtor's answer denying the debt,
filed the required affidavit, which under the Washington statute1 0 compelled
portance of the differences." Rios v. Dillman, 499 F.2d 329, 334 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974). The
Fifth Circuit concluded that the factual similarities between the case under consideration and
the related Supreme Court action made the Supreme Court's summary opinion "highly
persuasive-if not controlling- authority" which the court was not free simply to disregard. Id.
101. See, e.g., United States Gen., Inc. v. Arndt, 417 F. Supp. 1300, 1311-13 (E.D. Wis.
1976) (applied Mitchell, but indicated that it was applying Fuentes as interpreted by
Di-Chem); Terranova v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 1402, 1407 (D. Vt. 1975) (commented on the uncertain course of the Supreme Court and the uncertainty that the decision would be upheld); Hutchison v. Bank of N.C., 392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C. 1975)
(applied Mitchell); Thompson v. DeHart, 84 Wash. 2d 931, 530 P.2d 272 (1975) (distinguished
Fuentes and applied Mitchell).
102. Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§33-981 to -1006 (1973).
103. Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. at 997.
104. Id. at 999.
105. 526 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
106. WASH. REv. CODE ANN, §§7.12,010-.330 (1973), as amended by 1973 Wash.. Laws
ch. 154, §16.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss3/6

16

Hetsko: Debtors' and Creditors' Due Process: Applying the Balancing Stand
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

the court clerk to issue the writ of attachment. The statute required that, after
the property had been attached, the creditor demonstrate at an early hearing
that the writ was properly issued.' 0 7 Applying Spielman-Fond, the court found
no significant taking of a property interest and therefore found no need to
address due process questions."1s The court observed in dicta, however, that
the Washington statute provided for a hearing much like the Louisiana statute
upheld in Mitchell."°9 Thus, had this court applied due process to real property attachment, it nonetheless might have validated the Washington procedure. Instead, by finding that a lien on real property was not a significant
taking of property, the Northwest Homes court foreclosed analysis as to the
applicable due process standard.
The Spielman-Fond rationale was also applied by the Arizona Court of
Appeals in First Recreation Corp. v. Amoroso." 0 In a suit on a promissory
note, the plaintiff in Amoroso sought to attach real property of the debtor.
The writ was issued without notice, and no hearing was held either before or
immediately after the issuance of the writ.-' The only method of dissolution

available to the debtor was to post bond.1 2 The court held that SpielmanFond was controlling and thus found no property interest at stake sufficient to
invoke the notice and hearing requirements enunciated by the Supreme Court.
The unfortunate conclusion of these courts that the attachment of a lien to
real property does not fall within the ambit of due process probably emanated
from pre-Mitchell Court decisions, interpreted as allowing little procedural
variation to accommodate various property interests affected. 113 Under the
balancing test advanced by Mitchell,"M the debtor's clear interest in maintaining a free and unencumbered title to real property obviates any reason for the
no taking approach. 1 "5Thus, applying Mitchell in Northwest Homes would
not necessarily have invalidated the Washington statute, but would have required at least minimal due process protection for owners of real estate. Under
the balancing approach, the interest of the real property owner in maintaining
107. 526 F.2d at 505.
108. Id. at 506. Almost one year earlier, the same statute was upheld in the face of a
due process attack by the Washington supreme court. The Washington court, however,
found that there was a significant taking of property, but that the statute fit within the
extraordinary situations exception of Fuentes. Thompson v. DeHart, 84 Wash. 2d 931, 935,

530 P.2d
109.
110.
111.
112.

272, 274 (1975).
526 F.2d at 506-07.
26 Ariz. App. 477, 549 P.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1976).
Id. at 479, 549 P.2d at 258-59.
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§12-1521 to -1539 (1973), as amended by 1976 Ariz. Legis.

Serv., ch. 170, §§9-13.
113. As one commentator has explained, Fuentes asked only whether there was a significant taking of property thait would invoke due process. Under Mitchell a second question
would be asked: What kind of safeguards does due process require? Pearson (pt. 2), supra
note 14, at 285.
114. See text accompanying notes 39-40, 44-46 supra.
115. See, e.g., Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973)
(restriction of power to alienate clear title to real property is a taking of property); Clement

v. Four N. State St. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933 (D.NH. 1973) (impairment of title to real
estate triggers due process protection).
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clear title, although less important than one's need for continued use and
possession of personal goods, would be measured against the creditor's interest
in obtaining a lien, an interest equally valuable whether personal or real
property is involved. Indeed, even under Fuentes, the lesser interest in real
property cases would permit less stringent requirements of prior notice and
hearing."16 Under the more flexible Mitchell analysis, fewer safeguards would
be necessary for the procedure to be held constitutional even in the absence of
a prior hearing requirement."7 Although the Supreme Court has placed considerable emphasis on judicial discretion in issuing the writ 18 and on the
ability of the debtor to quickly and effectively challenge any seizure, 9 the
debtor's lesser interest in maintaining unencumbered title greatly abates the
functional desirability of requiring judicial supervision prior to the attachment. However, the interest of the debtor in clearing title should retain sufficient weight to require an opportunity for an immediate postseizure hearing.
Taking. Illustrating the second approach taken by lower courts in real
property attachments is the decision by a three-judge district court in United
States General,Inc. v. Arndt. 20 The creditor in Arndt filed an action to recover

from the debtor corporation money owed for services performed. The creditor
contemporaneously filed for a writ of attachment by presenting an affidavit
consisting of conclusory allegations. 21 After bond was posted, the court clerk,
as required by statute, automatically issued the writ.1 22 Although allowed to
challenge the grounds for issuance of the writ at any time before trial, the
debtor instead initiated a separate action in federal court to challenge the constitutionality of the procedure.
The court in invalidating the statute stated that it applied "Fuentes, as
interpreted in North Georgia Finishing."123 Actually, the court considered

only the debtor's property interest and neglected the interest of the creditor.
According to the Arndt court, the statute failed for the following reasons: (1)
the writ could be issued upon conclusory allegations; (2) the security bond required of the creditor was inadequate; (3) there was no opportunity for an
immediate hearing; and, most important to the court; (4) the debtor was
specifically precluded at the dissolution hearing from challenging the creditor's
likelihood of success on the merits. 2 4 The court's mechanical application of
Mitchell is amply demonstrated by the conclusion that the procedure was un116.

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 86. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.

117. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
118. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 607; Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. at 605-06, 609-10; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 83-84. See text accompanying

note 53 supra.
119. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. at 75; North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
at 606-07; Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 606, 610. See text accompanying note 46
supra.
120. 417 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
121. Id. at 1306. The creditor had "executed an affidavit stating that the underlying
action was one for damages in excess of $500 which grew out of a contractual agreement." Id.

122. Wis.
123.

STAT. ANN.

§§811.01-.26 (West 1977).

417 F. Supp. at 1312.

124. Id. at 1312-13.
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constitutional simply because no immediate postseizure hearing was required 25
despite the statutory provision for a hearing to vacate or modify the writ
within five days of the filing of a motion by the debtor. 126 The Arndt court
expressed concern that the statute failed to set a time within which the motion
must be decided, yet under the Louisiana statute upheld in Mitchell, the
hearing was not required to be held within a certain time period. 12 7 Indeed,
several Louisiana court decisions prior to Mitchell upheld attachments in
situations in which four weeks to three months had passed between the motion
and the hearing. 12 In this respect, the Wisconsin statute's five-day requirement
better protects the debtor's interests.
Notwithstanding this protection of the debtor's interests, the statute failed
to allow the debtor to challenge the underlying merits of the creditor's claim
that formed the basis for issuing the writ. Thus, the statute largely negated the
benefit provided by the opportunity for an immediate hearing. Unlike the
statute examined in Sugar,129 the Wisconsin statute could not be interpreted to
permit inquiry into the underlying merits of the claim.130 The Arndt court,
however, by its mechanical application of Mitchell avoided any meaningful
evaluation of the statutory accommodation of competing interests.
Another decision following the second approach in real property attachment is Hutchison v. Banli of North Carolina, 3' in which a three-judge district
court upheld North Carolina's attachment law. The creditor in Hutchison
brought suit against the debtor for money due on four promissory notes, filed
an affidavit alleging fraud by the debtor, 32 and secured a lien on a condominium unit owned by the debtor. The Hutchison court held that a lien on real
property effected a significant taking of property. It further observed the
Mitchell focus on the effectiveness of the challenged statute in minimizing the
risk of a wrongful taking resulting from an ex parte procedure and simultaneously accommodating the interest of the creditor in gaining possession of
the property. 33 The statute under review in Hutchison required that the
125. Id.
126. WIs.
127.

LA.

STAT. ANN.
CODE

CIV.

§811.18 (West 1977).

PRO. ANN.

art. 3506 (West 1961).

128. See, e.g., Hancock Bank v. Alexander, 256 La. 643, 237 So. 2d 669 (1970) (four weeks
from motion to hearing on dissolution); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Crescent Properties,
Co., 273 So. 2d 48 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (five weeks from motion to hearing on the motion);
Victory Elec. Works, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 140 So. 2d 183 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (hearing
held almost three months after motion).
129. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§6201-6226 (McKinney 1976). See text accompanying notes
57-58 supra.
130. Under Wis. STAT. ANN. §811.19 (West 1977), "the defendant may, by special answer,
deny the existence, at the time of the making of the attachment affidavit of the material facts
stated therein except the alleged liability and the amount thereof." (emphasis added).
131. 392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
132. The debtor then brought suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970), claiming that she had been deprived of property without due process of law. 392 F. Supp. at 891.
133. 392 F. Supp. at 893. The court concluded that despite Fuentes and its apparent
revival in Di-Chem, states may provide for prejudgment seizure without notice and prior
hearing because of the state interest in protecting creditors' remedies. Id. at 898. The court
observed that Mitchell and Di-Chem repudiated the Fuentes extraordinary situations excep-
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creditor post bond and allege specific facts to procure the writ. The debtor
could gain release of the property by posting bond or by prevailing at a dissolution proceeding to be heard before either a clerk or a judge. 34 The court
reasoned that the requirement that the creditor allege supporting facts was an
"important, initial step in ensuring against wrongful or abusive use of the
process by a creditor."'' 35 Although the writ was issued by a clerk, the court
found that North Carolina law and practice made the clerk more than a functionary, thus providing for the discretion that the Supreme Court emphasized
in cases after Fuentes.136 While the creditor in Hutchison had no prior interest
in the property seized, 37 the court found that, in light of Di-Chem, Mitchell
did not require that the creditor have a prior interest in the property for the
balancing process to apply. 38
The Hutchison decision thus illustrates that application of due process
standards does not compel the invalidation of a statutory scheme for attaching
liens to real property. Moreover, courts can balance the interests of creditors
and debtors by applying due process standards instead of foreclosing inquiry
into the accommodation effected by the statute with a finding that a prejudgment lien does not constitute a significant taking of property.
Attachment for JurisdictionalPurposes
When attachment is used to gain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
or a resident defendant who cannot be found, the seizure serves two functions.'139 First, it allows the acquisition of jurisdiction by an appropriate court,
and second, once jurisdiction is obtained, the attached property serves as
security for the plaintiff's ultimate recovery. Although few courts distinguish
between the two functions, 40 each of the two addresses distinctive interests
warranting separate scrutiny under the Mitchell balancing test. For example,
in the first instance great weight must be accorded to the state's interest in
gaining jurisdiction over property within its boundaries. Thus, acquisition of
jurisdiction may justify different, less demanding safeguards against wrongful
attachment because of the important state interest to be served. On the other
tion, even though the court mentioned that the statute would fit within the exception. Id.
at 895. If the extraordinary situations exception allowed seizure without notice or prior
hearing under the strict Fuentes rule, seizure is certainly allowed under the more relaxed
Mitchell approach.
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§1-440.1-.9 (1974).
135. 392 F. Supp. at 895.
136. Id. at 896. See text accompanying notes 34, 53 supra.
157. This was not true in Mitchell, in which the creditor had a prior interest in the

seized property. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
138. 592 F. Supp. at 898. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
139. Id. at 896; Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE
LJ. 1023, 1032 (1973).
140. Compare Maxwell v. Hixson, 385 F. Supp. 520, 525 (S.D. Tenn. 1974) (foreign
attachment serves only to gain jurisdiction), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1656 (1976) with Jonnet v. Dollar
Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1125, 1129 (3d Cir. 1976) (plaintiff has two interests served: establishing
jurisdiction and restraining property for eventual payment of claim) and Hutchison v..Bank
of N.C., 592 F. Supp. 888, 896 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (distinguishing between the functions).
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hand, if jurisdiction can be obtained by other means, such as the use of a longarm statute or a general appearance of the defendant, 141 the state interest in
gaining jurisdiction disappears. 142 In this case, the attachment would serve
only as security for the plaintiff's claim and the balancing process thus would
dictate greater safeguards for the debtor's interest.
Many lower courts in this area have relied on citations by the Supreme
Court in Fuentes143 and Mitchell144 that seemingly refer to the Court's decision
in Ownbey v. Morgan145 as approving foreign attachment without prior notice
or hearing. The defendant in Ownbey, however, challenged, not the constitutionality of the jurisdictional attachment, but rather the requirement that he
post bond before he could file a general appearance.

46

Also, since 1921 when

Ownbey was decided, subsequent changes in the law have cast doubt on its
t
whether access to a court
continued validity. Under Boddie v. Connecticut 47
can be conditioned upon the payment of a substantial bail is questionable.
Further, the decision in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington148 gave states a
new method of obtaining jurisdiction over many nonresidents that was unavailable at the time of Ownbey. Thus, since Ownbey was decided, foreign
attachment has lost much of its importance as a means of obtaining jurisdic49

tion.1

One example of questionable court reliance on Ownbey as immunizing
foreign attachment from notice and hearing requirements is the decision of a
three-judge district court in Maxwell v. Nixon."0 The creditor in Maxwell
sued for money due on a note and attempted to obtain service of process on
the debtor. Following the return of the sheriff stating that the debtor was "not
to be found in my county," the writ of garnishment was issued without further
allegations by the creditor and without notice to the debtor., 51 Under Tennessee law, the defendant could appear specially and contest the allegation of
absence from the jurisdiction that was the basis of the issuing of the writ. The
52
debtor could also obtain release of the garnished wages by posting a bond.
Despite possible due process deficiencies, the statute was upheld as constitu-

141.
142.
143.

See text accompanying notes 169-170 infra.
See generally Note, supra note 139.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 83 n.23.

144. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 613.
145. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
146. Id. at 110-12. The bond requirement was eliminated by the legislature prior to the
decision of the Supreme Court. Ownbey v. Morgan, 30 Del. (7 Boyce) 297, 323, 105 A. 838,
849 (1917).
147. 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigents must be afforded free access to court to obtain
divorce).
148. 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (allowing a court to obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who maintained minimum contacts with the state).
149. Jurisdiction over nonresidents is now commonly obtained through the use of so
called long arm statutes. Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A ConstitutionalAnalysis,
73 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 763-68 (1973); Note, supra note 139.
150. 383 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
151. ld. at 321-22.
152. TENN. CODE ANN. §§2S-601 to -665 (1976).
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tional. The Maxwell court discounted the applicability of Mitchell153 because
of the Supreme Court's Ownbey citation which, according to the Maxwell
court, showed the continued vitality of the "rule laid down in Ownbey v.
Morgan according due process approval to the use of an attachment without
prior notice where the use of the attachment was necessary to the acquisition
of jurisdiction." 154

Although the statute at issue in Maxwell might have been upheld under
Mitchell, substantial doubt exists as to whether the statute could withstand an
exacting balancing scrutiny since the creditor in Maxwell had garnished the
debtor's wages, subjecting the debtor to substantial financial difficulty. As in
Sniadach, in which wage garnishment necessitated prior notice and hearing
because of the potential harm to the debtor,155 stringent safeguarding of wage
garnishment would seem appropriate here even though the state interest in
obtaining jurisdiction is also entitled to great weight.
While several other courts similarly have relied on Ownbey, the continued
effect of these decisions should be very limited. Because most of these decisions
arose in-6 or relied on 57 cases in the Third Circuit, the continued vitality of
such cases is doubtful in light of the recent Third Circuit decision of Jonnet v.
Dollar Savings Bank5 8 in which the Pennsylvania attachment procedure was
held to be unconstitutional. The Jonnet decision overruled one prior case' 59
and severely limited the future significance of Ownbey. In Jonnet, the plaintiff
filed a complaint alleging that the defendant had failed to honor a mortgage
commitment. Several days later, the plaintiff obtained from the court clerk
writs of garnishment, which were served on two corporations obliged to make
contractual payments to the debtor. Issued without prior notice or hearing, the
writs were based on a praecipe that gave no indication of the merits of the
plaintiff's claim. 6° Furthermore, neither was a bond required nor was discretion allowed in issuing the writ. 161 The writs could be dissolved only when the

defendant posted security.
As the Jonnet court observed, the plaintiff in Ownbey had questioned only
the conditioning of the hearing on the payment of a bond. The court thus concluded that Ownbey stood for the proposition that due process did not require
153. 383 F. Supp. at 322-23. The statute's failure to require posting of bond or any
allegations for the writ to issue raised questions concerning the applicability of Mitchell.
The statute upheld in Mitchell had required that the creditor post bond and support his
allegations with an affidavit of specific facts, but the Court did not hold that these safeguards
were constitutionally required. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
154. 383 F. Supp. at 325.
155. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
156. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1972) (upholding
Pennsylvania foreign attachment statute after the Sniadach decision but before Fuentes);
Baiter v. Bato Co., 385 F. Supp. 420 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (upholding Pennsylvania foreign
attachment statute after the Mitchell decision but without even mentioning Mitchell).
157. Allen Trucking Co. v. Adams, 56 Ala. App. 478, 323 So. 2d 367 (Civ. App. 1975).
158. 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976).
159. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1972), overruled by
Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1124 (3d Cir. 1976).
160. 530 F.2d at 1125.
.161. PA. R. Civ. P. 1251-1279 (1976).
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that notice and a hearing precede foreign attachments. Applying the reasoning
of Mitchell, the court tested the adequacy of the statute's accommodation of
the interests of the parties.'1 The Pennsylvania statute under review in Jonnet
was found overly protective of the creditor's interests because of the lack of a
requirement that specific facts to support the writ be alleged and because the
writ was not issued by an officer possessing discretionary powers. 16 3 Most im-

portantly, the statute failed to provide the defendant any means for promptly
contesting the attachment. While the court noted the balancing approach of
Mitchell,164 it appeared to apply Mitchell as if each of the safeguards were
always mandated. Although the court thus ignored the substance of Mitchell,
Jonnet nonetheless represents a major forward step in correctly applying due
process protection to foreign attachments.
The Mitchell balancing test was more faithfully applied in Greyhound
Corp. v. Heitner,165 in which the Delaware supreme court upheld that state's
sequestration statute in a stockholders' derivation action. The suit was brought
on behalf of the Greyhound Corporation against nonresident defendants who
were served under the sequestration statute. Shares of stock and certain contract rights that the defendants held under agreements with Greyhound were
seized. The Delaware court, rather than simply applying the safeguards approved in Mitchell as a "litmus test,"166 penetratingly analyzed the statute and
found an appropriate balance of the interests of both parties. Referring to
Jonnet, the Greyhound court noted that the creditor had two interests in
foreign attachment: to establish jurisdiction and to restrain property for the
eventual payment of the judgment. 1 7 The debtor's interests were safeguarded
by the following requirements: (1) a judge controlled the process at all times;
(2) the property seized had a value reasonably related to the amount of the asserted claim; (3) notice be given to the debtor immediately following the
seizure; (4) before making a general appearance, the defendant could challenge
compliance with the rules for issuing the writs; (5) after a general appearance,
the defendant's property would be returned unless the plaintiff could show
that such a release would render satisfaction of any judgment obtained less
likely; and (6) the defendant retained some control over the property seized.16 8
162. 530 F.2d at 1129. Plaintiff's interests were defined as establishing jurisdiction and
restraining property for eventual payment of a successfully established claim. Defendant's
interests were stated as maintaining control over the use and possession of his property and
his ability to conveniently defend his lawsuit. For more on the ability of a state to force a
nonresident into an inconvenient court, see Note, Developments in the Law -State Court
Jurisdiction,73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 953-55 (1954).

163. 530 F.2d at 1129-30.
164. Id. at 1129.
165. 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
166. Id. at 232.
167. Id. See text accompanying notes 139-140 supra.
168. 361 A.2d at 232-34. The court specifically rejected the defendant's claim that requiring a general appearance before allowing a hearing on the merits of the claim violated due
process, stating that a valid public purpose was served by concentrating settlement of claims
in one action. Id. at 235. The court's rejection of this argument is unfortunate. Although
Delaware has an interest in gaining jurisdiction over the person and the property, the
Supreme Court has ruled that jurisdiction over the person may be obtained only if that
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The court thus concluded that the statute represented a balancing of the
interests of the parties and fully comported with due process.
Until recently, lower court decisions in the area of due process requirements of attachment for jurisdictional purposes have generally failed to apply
the Mitchell balancing test because of their misplaced reliance on ambiguous
Court citations to Ownbey. 69 The more recent momentum of Jonnet and
Greyhound, however, is toward limiting Ownbey and applying the Mitchell
test to foreign attachment statutes, thus extending protection against deprivation of property without due process of law to nonresidents of forum states.
Because of the strength of the state interest in obtaining jurisdiction over
nonresidents owning property within the state, 70 the level of due process
protection due the nonresident debtor may be less than that afforded residents
already subject to the jurisdiction of the state. Thus, in assessing the validity
of prejudgment seizures for jurisdictional purposes, the Mitchell balancing
formula includes not only creditor and debtor interests but also the interest of
the state in obtaining jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

The Mitchell Safeguards: A BalancingTest, Not a Check List
The lack of clarity in Supreme Court decisions applying due process concepts to prejudgment seizures has confused the lower courts as to the appropriate standards for determining the constitutionality of statutes authorizing prejudgment seizures.?71 Clearly, any prejudgment seizure statute incorporating all
the safeguards of the Louisiana statute upheld in Mitchell1 2 would be constitutionally secure. Accordingly, as a practical matter many states will adopt
statutes incorporating all these provisions to foreclose serious constitutional
challenges to the processes authorizing seizures. 7 3 Whether all five safeguards
need be present in every situation, however, has not been answered directly by
person has certain minimum contacts with the state. International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945). The only contact with Delaware by the defendants in Greyhound was
stock held in a Delaware corporation. Further, as was noted recently in a decision of the
Third Circuit, none of the acts forming the basis of the Greyhound suit was performed in
Delaware. U.S. Indus. Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976).
169. See text accompanying notes 140-149 supra.
170. At least one commentator has observed that the state interest in obtaining jurisdiction aids individual plaintiffs rather than the general public and is therefore a "public
interest of a lower order." Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor
Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355, 366 (1973). Also, where other means of obtaining
jurisdiction are available, the state interest in seizing property to gain jurisdiction is reduced. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979, 981-82 (3d Cir. 1972). See text
accompanying notes 148-149 supra.
171 See text accompanying notes 62-170 supra.
172. Those requirements were: (1) bond posting by the creditor; (2) an affidavit supported by an allegation of specific facts; (3) issuance of the writ by a judge having discretionary powers; (4) an immediate postseizure hearing if the debtor moves for it; and (5) possession of the seized property to be regained by the debtor upon posting a bond. LA. CODE CIV.

PRO. ANN. art. 3501, 3506-3508, 3571, 3574, 3576 (West 1961).
173.

See, e.g., 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-19, §1 (to be codified as Fr-. STAT. §78.068).
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A careful reading of Mitchell indicates that it does not

mandate a mechanical application of certain criteria so that the Louisiana
provisions need not be present in every statute. Instead, the Supreme Court has
adopted a balancing approach in effectuating the commands of due process.
In developing the balancing test the Court assigned varying weights to the
five Mitchell safeguards. Most important is the opportunity for an immediate
postseizure hearing, 179 because it is the one Mitchell provision most inextricably tied to the due process right to be heard.1 7 6 Courts are unlikely to find
circumstances balanced in the creditors' favor sufficiently to justify upholding
a statute that provides for no postseizure hearing. 7 7 Indeed, lower court decisions have consistently invalidated statutes that do not provide an opportunity for a postseizure hearing immediately after seizure. 1 8 Given the critical
role of the postseizure hearing, a statute having no other Mitchell safeguard
could be upheld if the statute under review either contained other safeguards
adequately protecting the interests of both parties or applied only to real
estate attachment or foreign attachment, which traditionally have been sub79
jected to less demanding procedural requirements.
In the usual attachment and garnishment situation, however, lower courts
have required more than a postseizure hearing. 0° At a minimum, these decisions have insisted that the writ be issued by an officer with discretionary
power, 8 1 who may, in some cases, not be a judge.8 2 Closely related to issuance
by a discretionary officer is the Mitchell ingredient of an affidavit alleging
174. Authorities are divided on the question whether any particular safeguards are constitutionally required. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
175. See text accompanying notes 118-119 supra. Discretionary issuance of the writ also
supports the Mitchell provision of an affidavit of specific factual allegations. Unless the officer
is presented with facts, the discretion may not be fully utilized. Pearson (pt. 2), supra note 14,
at 298. Contra, Scott, supra note 14, at 854.
176. Cf. Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d 1355, 1368-69 (5th Cir. 1976) (upheld
Florida postjudgment garnishment procedures primarily because of the prompt availability
of a postseizure hearing).
177. But see Stanton v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 388 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
178. Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976); Guzman v. Western State
Bank, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975); Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975),
prob. juris. noted sub nom. TTainor v. Hernandez, 96 S. Ct. 2622 (1976); Unique Caterers,
Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1976).
179. See text accompanying notes 98-162 supra.
180. Although the Court has not yet examined a law providing for an immediate postseizure hearing after a writ was issued by a clerk with discretionary powers, the clear indication from both concurrences and dissents is that the Court would uphold such a law. See,
e.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 611 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring)
(issuance by a clerk is allowed since the basic protection for the debtor is supplied by the
immediate postseizure hearing before a judge); id. at 619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (clerkjudge distinction of little value so long as the writ is issued by a court officer not by an
agent of the creditor).
181. See, e.g., Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975); Hernandez v.
Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. 11. 1975), prob. juris. noted sub non. Trainor v. Hernandez,
96 S. Ct. 2622 (1976); Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1976).
182. Hutchison v. Bank of N.C., 392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Hood Motor Co. v.
Lawrence, 320 So. 2d 111 (La. 1975).
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specific facts justifying the issuance of the writ. Few courts have extensively
treated this provision, and the specific facts safeguard appears to be less im53
portant than discretionary issuance.'
Clearly less important in minimizing the danger of a wrongful taking is the
requirement that the creditor post bond prior to obtaining the writ. Only if
the amount at issue is substantial would most plaintiffs have any difficulty
raising the necessary bond. Indeed, three recent cases have upheld attachment
laws that contained no provisions for the creditors to post bonds.184 A bond
posting requirement nonetheless provides a fund from which to compensate a
debtor for any damage caused by wrongful seizure.
FactorsInfluencing the Balancing
Even if a statute contains some Mitchell safeguards, the facts of a particular
case may influence a court to invalidate a prejudgment seizure process inasmuch as concern for the debtor pervades the balancing process. Sniadach indicated that procedures permitting the seizure of a person's wages will be intensely scrutinized. 8 5 Similarly, Guzman ruled in favor of a family whose home
had been seized without notice, even though the challenged scheme utilized
several Mitchell safeguards.' 8 1 When necessities such as wages or living quarters
are seized by creditors, prejudgment attachment and garnishment may never be
allowed absent notice and an opportunity for a prior hearing, because of the
debtor's manifest interest in maintaining possession and use.
Another factor that may affect the balancing analysis is the debtor's status
as either a person or a business entity. If the debtor is a business, courts as a
87
minimum require that seizure be followed by an opportunity for a hearing.3
Beyond this threshold requirement, however, the overall effect of the debtor's
business identity on the balancing process is uncertain and the question of
which of the procedural safeguards will be required remains unanswered. To
date, few lower court decisions and only the Supreme Court decisions in DiChem and Sugar have involved corporate debtors. The Court's holding in DiChem invalidated a dearly inadequate statutory scheme. 88 The decision in
Sugar indicated that corporations might be entitled to the same due process
183. Hutchison v. Bank of N.C., 392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Unique Caterers,
Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1976). But see Maxwell v. Hixson, 383 F. Supp.

320 (E.D. Tenn. 1974). Indeed, one commentator has found the protection afforded by this
provision to be minimal. Scott, supra note 14, at 854-55. Professor Scott indicates that the

specific facts requirement will only increase the cost of prejudgment seizure procedures without providing any benefits to the debtor or creditor. Id.
184. Maxwell v. Hixson, 383 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Tenn. 1974) (foreign attachment);
Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976) (foreign attachment); Hood Motor
Co. v. Lawrence, 320 So. 2d 111 (La. 1975) (seizure and sale of personal property to enforce
a mortgage).
185. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
186. See text accompanying notes 88-97 supra.
187. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419

U.S. 601 (1975). But see Stanton v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 388 F. Supp. 1171
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
188. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss3/6

26

Hetsko: Debtors' and Creditors' Due Process: Applying the Balancing Stand
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

Vl XXIX
[Vol.

rights accorded individuals.1s9 The recent lower court decision in Stanton v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,190 however, suggests that business defendants might be afforded less protection by procedural safeguards. The court
in Stanton upheld an attachment for jurisdictional purposes even though the
defendant had no opportunity to challenge the attachment prior to a trial on
the merits.
Although some decisions in each area of due process application to prejudgment seizures properly embrace the Mitchell balancing test, a substantial number of courts have failed to apply the appropriate standard of due process.
Recent judicial momentum assessing prejudgment seizure of personal property
for jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional purposes indicates that creditors and
debtors in the future can expect to find more widespread application of the
Mitchell balancing test. Yet, while most decisions reviewing statutes allowing
prejudgment seizure of personal property have utilized a balancing process,
other decisions have misconstrued Mitchell and applied it in a mechanical
fashion by determining whether the five safeguards are present in the reviewed
statute. 191 Another area of judicial bewilderment is attachment for jurisdictional purposes, an area needlessly complicated by Supreme Court citations to
Ownbey leading many lower courts to summarily reject the applicability of due
process to foreign attachment statutes.192 Recently, however, several courts
properly limited Ownbey and applied a balancing test to the statute under
review.193 The future of real property attachment is much less certain, federal
courts having split on the threshhold issue of whether such a significant property taking is involved as to invoke due process considerations.19 4 Among those
courts finding a deprivation of property, disagreement has arisen over the
appropriate due process analysis, with some courts following Fuentes while
other courts follow Mitchell.195 This confusion of lower courts in all areas of
due process application to prejudgment creditors' remedies will probably continue until the Supreme Court further emphasizes that courts are to employ

189. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976). See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
190. 388 F. Supp. 1171 (S D.N.Y. 1975). There is support, however, for the proposition
that businesses must be accorded the same due process rights as nonbusiness debtors. See
First Recreation Corp. v. Amososo, 26 Ariz. App. 477, 480, 549 P.2d 257, 260 (Ct. App. 1976);
Pearson (pt. 2), supra note 14, at 301-02.
191. See text accompanying notes 68-80 supra.
192. See text accompanying notes 143-155 supra. One decision that applied due process
considerations used the Fuentes extraordinary situations exception, which really is just
another method of exempting the procedure from due process analysis. See Usdan v. Dunn
Paper Co., 392 F. Supp. 953 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
193. See text accompanying notes 156-170 supra.
194.

Compare In re Northwest Homes, Inc., 526 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,

425 U.S. 907 (1976) (no taking of property to invoke due process considerations) with United
States Gen., Inc. v. Arndt, 417 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (three-judge district court
applied due process considerations) and Hutchison v. Bank of N.C., 392 F. Supp. 888
(M.D.N.C. 1975) (three-judge district court finding a taking and applying due process considerations).
195. Compare Hutchison v. Bank of N.C., 392 F.Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (applied
Mitchell) with Thompson v. DeHart, 84 Wash. 2d 931, 530 P.2d 272 (1975) (applied Fuentes).
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the Mitchell balancing test in judging prejudgment remedies. The Court must
stress that the Mitchell test is not a checklist but a balancing process.
J.FFREY
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